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Trial Tactics
“Impeaching” Cooperating
Witnesses

T

he government charges a defendant with a
crime and obtains the help of a witness
involved in the criminal activity. The witness
enters into a plea agreement with the government,
and is called to testify at trial. The defendant offers
to stipulate that the defense will make no effort to
impeach the witness through the use of the plea
agreement and moves to exclude it from evidence.
The prosecutor insists upon using the agreement.
What is the proper result?

United States v. Richardson: The facts
United States v. Richardson, 421 F.3d 17 (1st Cir.
2005), provides an answer. Arguably, it is the
wrong answer on the facts presented.
Joanne Richardson was convicted for making
false statements to a grand jury investigating allegations of Medicare/Medicaid fraud after she was
granted use immunity. Richardson was employed as
a regional account manager for a pharmaceutical
company that manufactured a number of drugs,
including Lupron, a prescription drug used in the
treatment of prostate cancer. The grand jury was
investigating whether the company and some of its
employees provided things of value as an inducement
to certain customers to purchase and prescribe the
company’s products. Richardson denied in her grand
jury testimony that she had ever offered or discussed
offering things of value to a particular customer in
1997 in a scheme that would ultimately reduce the
price of Lupron as compared to a competing drug.
The indictment charged her with 19 false statements
to the grand jury with respect to this testimony.
At trial, the government presented the testimony
of a former company employee, Kimberlee Chase,
who was Richardson’s supervisor in 1996 and who
left the company in 1997. Chase testified about the
company’s internal procedures, explained that
Richardson’s regular reports to her supervisors were
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expected to be accurate and complete because they
were heavily relied upon by company employees,
and described the way in which salary bonuses at the
company were used as an incentive to improve sales
performance by employees.

The impeachment
The government introduced both testimonial and
documentary evidence that Chase had pled guilty to
conspiracy to defraud a federal agency and other
charges based on conduct during her employment
with the company. The court described the government as having acted “[i]n order to remove the sting
of any attempt by Richardson to impeach Chase.”
Richardson objected to the introduction of the evidence on the ground that it might unfairly prejudice
her because the jury might assume guilt by association, since Chase was her former supervisor and had
pled guilty to a felony. Richardson emphasized that
Chase had left the company before Richardson began
the negotiations with her customer that was at the
core of the false statement charges, and Chase admitted that she had no personal knowledge of these
negotiations. Moreover, Richardson offered to forgo
impeachment of Chase in order to prevent the government from introducing evidence of the guilty plea
as part of its case-in-chief.

A precedent
The court relied upon its earlier decision in United
States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1984), for the
proposition that a defendant’s pledge not to impeach
government witnesses does mean that a jury would
not benefit from what might be regarded as impeachment material. In McNeill, the defendant was the former acting budget director for the City of Boston. He
was charged with and convicted of using the mail to
further a temporarily successful attempt to defraud
the State-Boston Retirement System of accidental disability pension benefits. McNeill filed an application
for a pension in which he claimed permanent back
injury from a fall four years earlier on an “icy corridor” in Boston City Hall. A backdated injury report,
which listed as witnesses three friends who had not
seen his fall, and an examination by a three-doctor
panel led the State-Boston Retirement Board to award
McNeill an annual pension of $37,000. The prosecution proved at trial that McNeill had told his treating
physicians that his back problem had begun a year
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earlier and had been aggravated by playing golf and
bending over to put on his socks, and had said nothing about a fall. The insurance forms similarly made
no mention of an accident. McNeill’s trial testimony
was in conflict with his own backdated injury report.
Two government witnesses were McNeill’s personal friends. One was executive secretary of the
retirement board. The other was listed as one of the
witnesses to McNeill’s alleged fall in city hall.
McNeill moved to forbid the government from
eliciting on direct examination the fact that each of
these witnesses had received immunity and were
compelled to testify and stated that he would not
seek to impeach the witnesses’ credibility on crossexamination. McNeill contended that this government tactic prejudiced him by arousing suspicions
of widespread corruption in city hall. The trial
judge permitted the impeachment and the court of
appeals affirmed, reasoning as follows:
The fact of immunity and compulsion orders
aids the jury function regardless of whether
defendant intended to attack the credibility of
the witnesses. The witnesses’ personal or professional ties to McNeill led the government to
believe that an immunity grant and compulsion
order would best insure that the witnesses testified (without pleading their Fifth Amendment
right not to respond) truthfully (because their
immunity grants would not bar a subsequent
prosecution for perjury). We recognize that evidence of a grant of immunity may also have
bolstered the witnesses’ credibility, by showing
their interest in telling the truth: they could not
have incriminated themselves with the truth, but
could have been prosecuted for perjury if they
lied. However, as indicated above, the very need
for the immunity and compulsion orders in this
case undercut the credibility of these witnesses.
That the government asked the witnesses to
explain their understandings of the immunity
agreements does not automatically constitute
impermissible government vouching for the
veracity of the witnesses. . . . In this context, the
jury deserved an opportunity to draw its own
inferences from the special circumstances under
which these witnesses testified.
(Id. at 14.)

Application to Richardson
The Richardson court concluded that the same analysis applied as in McNeill. The court rejected
Richardson’s argument that Chase’s testimony was

largely irrelevant to the charges against her, and found
that the testimony was relevant to establish the internal procedures at the company. It reasoned that “the
government properly sought to introduce evidence of
her guilty plea so that the jury could evaluate her
credibility.” (421 F.3d at 40-41.) The court emphasized that the trial judge had given a lengthy instruction to the jury in connection with Chase’s testimony
and repeated it when the case was submitted to the
jury. The trial judge’s instruction was as follows:
[I]t’s up to you whether you believe her, or
disbelieve her or believe her in part, she testifies she’s got a plea bargain with the government and she’s hoping for a lesser sentence
having pleaded guilty to whatever she’s
pleaded guilty to.
Now you are entitled to know that the better to help you assess her testimony, the
believability of her testimony. Here’s what I
want to caution you on. The fact that [Chase
has] pleaded guilty to something in no way
affects your judgment about Ms. Richardson.
In no way. It doesn’t at all. Now, you listen to
what she says like with all the other witnesses, if you believe that that may have something to do with the case as between the government and Ms. Richardson. But this business that she has . . . pleaded guilty [to] is
only before you so that you can evaluate her
testimony. That’s the only reason.
(Id. at 41.)
The efficacy of this instruction is subject to
greater doubt than the court of appeals suggests. The
judge not only permitted the government to elicit the
fact that Chase had pleaded guilty. It offered into
evidence the plea agreement itself, which contained
a reference to the company’s “global criminal and
civil agreement with the United States, which agreement required the payment of $585,000 in civil settlement payments, including restitution.” The judge
redacted this quoted portion before sending the
agreement to the jury during deliberations, but the
jury had seen the unredacted version during the
examination of Chase when the government published it for the jury to review.
Unfortunately for Richardson, defense counsel
did not object to the unredacted agreement before
it was published, so the court reviewed the objection to it for plain error. The court cited and quoted, id. at 41-42, from United States v. Newton, 891
F.2d 944, 951 (1st Cir. 1989), which in turn quoted
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from United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987):
Such agreements may often, as in the present
case, point in different directions: a warning
therein that the defendant will be prosecuted
for false testimony enhances his credibility as
a witness, but the rewards promised in the
same document may undermine his credibility
by showing that he stood to gain from incriminating others. . . . Only by viewing the entire
agreement can the jury get the whole picture,
from which to assess, as best it can, the probable motives or interests the witnesses could
have in testifying truthfully or falsely.
The reasoning of the prior cases is suspect, given
how unnecessary certain language in a plea agreement might be. In the context of Richardson, the language regarding the company tended to suggest that
the entire company was involved in illegal payments
or offers, which would have substantially undermined
Richardson’s defense that her testimony was true.

Comparing McNeill and Richardson
There is a sensible distinction to be drawn between
McNeill and Richardson. In McNeill, the government was calling two friends of the defendant.
Although it could compel them to be witnesses as
a result of the immunity grants, the government
had no way to control how the witnesses would
behave on the stand. There was reason for the government to have the jury know the circumstances
of the witnesses’ testimony so that it could make a
proper evaluation of their credibility. If the witnesses appeared hostile to the government, the jury
would be in a position to know why. If the jury
wondered why the witnesses were testifying
against a friend, it would know why.
McNeill is similar to a case in which a witness
who has been a participant in criminal acts agrees to
plead and cooperate with the government. If the witness claims to have been involved in the acts for
which the defendant is on trial—acts that the defendant presumably denies or there would be no trial—
the jury has a great need to know why the witness is
also not on trial. If there has been a deal, the jury has
a need to know that fact whether or not the defense
intends to use a plea agreement for impeachment.
Richardson is a very different case. Chase left the
company before Richardson was involved with the
customer about whom she testified before the grand
jury. Thus, Chase made no claim that she knew about

Richardson’s conduct or was involved in it. On the
contrary, Chase specifically disclaimed any personal
knowledge about Richardson’s dealing with the customer. Chase was a witness offered for a very simple
purpose—i.e., to explain certain company procedures. The jury would have had no reason to doubt
her testimony or to wonder why she was testifying.
The fact that she left the company before Richardson
had dealings with the customer about whom she testified would have left the jury with the correct
impression that Chase had nothing relevant to say
about whether Richardson lied. Thus, the government had no reason to “impeach” her. Had Chase
never been impeached, the government’s case would
have suffered no damage. The impeachment, especially the use of the unredacted agreement, created a
genuine danger that the jury would learn of illegal
conduct other than that alleged in the indictment.

Conclusion
The fact that Federal Rule of Evidence 607 states that
“[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling the witness” does
not mean that a party may attack a witness when
doing so might unfairly prejudice an opponent. In
United States v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir.
1986), the court recognized that “[t]here does exist
the possibility of using a Rule 607 impeachment of
one’s own witness improperly if there is no relevant
contribution to be made by the witness’s principal testimony on direct examination.” On the facts of that
case, the court of appeals said “we think it a close
question whether the court should have allowed the
government to impeach its witness with an arguably
prejudicial fact that appellant had explicitly said she
would not use in challenging the witness’s credibility,
thereby eliminating the possibility of any potential
‘sting’ from disclosure of that information on crossexamination.” (Id. at 260.) The court decided the
close question in favor of upholding the admission of
the impeachment evidence because the defendant did
not promise not to impeach the witness in other ways.
In Richardson, the defendant offered to forgo
impeachment of Chase completely. There was no
need for either party to impeach Chase. Richardson
illustrates why Frappier’s recognition of a possibility of improper impeachment might be too narrow.
Frappier suggests that impeachment might be
improper if the witness to be impeached has contributed nothing on direct examination. Richardson
illustrates that the case for impeachment is
extremely weak when a witness contributes nothing that either party has reason to impeach. !
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